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TOWARD A RATIONAL SCHEME OF
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT
ADJUDICATION
Joseph W. Girardot*
The scarcity of water has always presented difficulties for the
development of the western United States, and the problem
shows no sign of abating.' As a result, each of the water-scarce
states constantly must seek further reliable and accessible
sources of water, primarily to support agriculture.2
The western states have developed elaborate schemes to ap-
portion intrastate waters for their own users.' In addition, these
states have developed arrangements to apportion surface waters
among themselves.4 They have allocated water by agreement
(compact), 5 and by judicial resolution (equitable apportion-
ment)., A third method, little used and external to the states
(but almost certainly influenced by them), is division by con-
gressional mandate.
* Associate, Bodman, Longley and Dahling; Managing Editor, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
(1988); B.A., University of Detroit, 1986; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1989.
1. Fredrick, Foreword to D. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER vii (1986); N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1983, at B10, col. 6; Goodgame, Just Enough to Fight Over, TIME, July 4,
1988, at 16. California's population alone is projected to increase 33% over the next two
decades, substantially increasing the amount of water used by that state. Id.
2. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 & n.14 (1982) (citing SOIL CONSERVA-
TION SERV., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRIC., AMERICA'S SOIL AND WATER: CONDITIONS AND
TRENDS (1980)); D. GIBBONS, supra note 1, at 23-24. The exact percentage of agricultural
use varies from state to state and, most markedly, from west to east. California, for in-
stance, uses 92% of its total daily water consumption for irrigation. In contrast, Indiana
uses only 33% of its total daily consumption of water for irrigation. As a rule the western
states tend to employ far more of their daily water consumption for irrigation. Id. at 24.
3. For a thorough discussion of the various methods of intrastate apportionment, see
F. TRELEASE & G. GOULD, WATER LAW (4th ed. 1986).
4. Allocation of ground water, a hotly contested issue, falls outside the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of the state of the law in this area, see Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 945-
54.
5. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987); Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). States may enter into agreements between
and among themselves with the consent of, Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. In
certain circumstances even the consent of Congress is not necessary. See infra note 22.
6. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
7. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). For a statement of the argu-
ments in favor of congressional apportionment of interstate waters, see Meyers, The Col-
orado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
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Of the three methods, the compact is of the greatest future
importance. Congressional mandate, although the most authori-
tative alternate, is the least employed method.' The states have
readily sought judicial equitable apportionment; this method,
though, is plagued by delay in adjudication and lack of litigants'
control over the eventual outcome.'
An interstate compact, however, finds the middle ground.
Compacting states more often than not seek congressional ap-
proval of their compacts, a step that may or may not be consti-
tutionally mandated, yet is nearly always taken.1" By involving
Congress in the process of compact formation, national concerns
may be aired, obviating the need for congressional statutory pre-
emption. Additionally, as the states themselves engage in the ac-
tual arm's length bargaining over an optimal division of waters,
an "equitable apportionment" takes place without resort to the
courts, thus conserving time and resources.
Interstate compacts, however, have difficulties of their own.
Consider the following not-so-hypothetical disputes:
*** Two or more states agree to divide the waters of a
river flowing across their mutual boundaries. The states,
however, reach an impasse over the details of the divi-
sion, and one decides to litigate the issue rather than
pursue further negotiations for a compact. The states
may ask the United States Supreme Court to decide the
case under its original jurisdiction, binding each state by
the terms of the judgment.
*** Two or more states agree on a compact, ratify it, and
submit it to Congress, which assents to the compact.1
Subsequently, one of the states discovers an inequitable
allocation due to errors in calculating the flow of the
8. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 952-53. Congress has traditionally deferred
to the states regarding water law; it is suggested, however, that Congress does have the
power to preempt the states in this area and has merely declined to exercise this right.
Id. at 953-54; cf. Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A
Federal Practitioner's Point of View, 19 PAC. L.J. 1323 (1988).
9. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 48, 51. Dean Meyers presents a compelling case
against Supreme Court adjudication of these controversies, denoting equitable appor-
tionment schemes as "a vague set of standards that are impossible to quantify." Id. at
49. He notes that, as a result of these vague standards, courts are reluctant to proceed in
water dispute cases. This inaction favors the upstream states, which are allowed to pro-
ceed as they please with the water regardless of the merits of the downstream state's
case. Id. at 49-50.
10. See infra, notes 22, 26.
11. For a concise description of the compacting process, see P. HARDY, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND (1982).
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river, to bad faith on the upstream state's part or both.
The state alleging the shortfall then appeals to the other
signatory state(s) to honor the terms of the compact, a
request that is refused. Because the states are equally
represented on the body that administers the terms of
the compact, a stalemate ensues. The protesting state's
only recourse is litigation.
This Note argues that the current method of resolving inter-
state water compact disputes is seriously flawed, and that the
current practice of invoking the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction to resolve these cases should be altered. This Note con-
tends that the compact itself should contain structural dispute
resolution procedures insisted upon by Congress before any
grant of approval is given to the agreement. Part I of this Note
examines the history of the compact clause of the Constitution
and its application in interstate relations. Part II explores how a
poorly drafted, yet fairly representative, water allocation com-
pact led two states to the Supreme Court in search of relief. Af-
ter analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions and orders attempt-
ing to resolve the issue, Part II concludes that the Court has no
intrinsically satisfactory remedy and must merely make the best
of a poor situation. Part III then examines alternative methods
of resolving these disputes, including federally mandated
tiebreakers for deadlocked compact commissions, administrative
resolution of compact disputes, and insistence by Congress on a
mandatory arbitration clause to be included in all future com-
pacts ratified by it. Part IV concludes that, for both legal and
practical reasons, arbitration constitutes the most suitable of the
three alternatives.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE COMPACT CLAUSE
In order to understand the complex interplay of the federal
and state spheres of interest in problems of river and stream al-
location and the almost accidental circumstances that produced
the present system, one must examine the history of the com-
pact clause and its predecessors in the Articles of Confederation
and British Colonial rule.
FALL 1989]
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A. The Compact Clause and its Precursors
The compact clause12 articulates one of the great themes of
the Constitution. Specifically, it forbids a state from making any
agreement with a foreign nation or with another state of the
union without first obtaining the consent of Congress. 13 The
clause codifies those shackles placed upon the states that distin-
guish state sovereignty from national sovereignty. Without these
restrictions a lasting union seems unlikely.
The compact clause has its roots in the adjudicative system
employed by Great Britain in the administration of the thirteen
colonies that became the original United States. Although Great
Britain treated the American Colonies in many respects as
though they were quasi-nations, disputes were mediated through
the Crown's intervention.1"
The Declaration of Independence 5 and the revolution, how-
ever, wrought great changes in the existing dispute resolution
system. Where previously the colonies could seek the guidance
of the Crown, the new states could only rely upon their relative
strength-politically, militarily, and economically-to enforce
their claims against others. The drafters of the Articles of Con-
federation16 recognized that under these conditions a simple ter-
ritorial dispute might jeopardize the entire war effort against
Great Britain. As a result the Articles provided for an interstate
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
13. Id. ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, .... enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power .... ").
14. The colonies were administered separately; save for their common relation to the
mother country, they were wholly independent of one another. In keeping with their
acknowledged quasi-national status, the colonies possessed those avenues of dispute res-
olution-vis-&-vis one another-open to completely sovereign nations. The colonies could
pursue the negotiation of settlements between themselves; they could appeal to the
crown for mediation that would take the form of a royal commission with appeal to the
Privy Council; or they could fight. See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact
Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 692-
93 (1925); see also Chapman, Where East Meets West in Water Law: The Formulation
of an Interstate Compact to Address the Diverse Problems of the Red River Basin, 38
OKLA. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1985).
Border disputes between the colonies were particularly fruitful sources of intercolony
dispute. Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 692-93. Notable controversies of this sort arose
between Massachusetts and New Hampshire from 1762 to 1768; between Massachusetts
and Rhode Island in 1740; and between New York and New Jersey in 1771. Id. at 754-57.
If the colonies decided to negotiate a settlement, that fact alone did not necessarily
conclude the issue. The Crown retained the right to review the agreement before grant-
ing its approval. Id. at 692 & n.29.
15. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
16. U.S. Articles of Confederation (1781).
[VOL. 23:1
FALL 1989] Water Compact Adjudication
dispute resolution system. This system expressly limited the
states' rights to pursue agreements among themselves,17 and also
provided for a new external adjudicator: the Congress."8 By re-
ducing the threat of state self-help, the Articles of Confederation
ensured that petty boundary disputes would not fragment the
nation in its effort to attain independence from Great Britain.
The Framers of the Constitution generally adopted the struc-
ture of interstate dispute resolution enunciated in the Articles of
Confederation. 9 One significant change, however, altered the si-
tus of appeal in matters of multi-state controversy. Whereas the
power to hear appeals lay with the Congress under the Articles,
the states must resort to the Supreme Court for adjudicatory re-
lief under the Constitution.2 Moreover, the Constitution affords
the Supreme Court original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction
in any dispute between two or more states.2
These changes have channelled most, if not all interstate dis-
putes to the Supreme Court at some stage. For example, if two
states elect to settle their differences in the form of a compact,
they may do so, subject to the will of Congress. 2 Nevertheless,
17. "No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance
whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled
.Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
18. "The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal
in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or
more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever . Id. at
art. IX, cl. 2. See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 14, at 693.
Notably, however, the procedures specified by the Articles for appeals to the Congress
were so convoluted and time-consuming that one writer suggests that the intent was "to
delay congressional action" in addition to assuring absolute impartiality on the part of
the committee Congress designated to hear the appeal. See M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION-AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 180 (1940) (discussing art. IX appeals procedure). Jen-
sen notes further that Congress was intended to act as an arbitrator "rather than to
make a decision or enforce a decision after it had been made." Id. at 181. The practical
import of the congressional role was that the drafters of the Articles may well have
wished to continue emphasizing the compacting process over the quasi-judicial process.
Given the numerous shackles placed upon Congress as an instrument of effective govern-
ance by the Articles, this conclusion seems quite plausible.
19. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 14, at 694; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 5. Congressional assent to a compact is not required, however, if
the net effect of the compact does not cause an "increase of political power in the States,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States."
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978) (quoting
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)). The Court has developed a three-factor
test to determine whether compacting states have, in fact, enhanced their political power
at the expense of the federal government or the other states. The first factor is whether
the compact "purport[s] to authorize the member States to exercise any powers they
could not exercise in its absence." Id. at 473. Secondly, the Court will inquire whether
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should their attempt at conciliation fail, either pre- or post-com-
pact formation, the state's only recourse would be to the Su-
preme Court.s3 The states may also elect to bypass the compact
process altogether and seek a hearing before the Court at the
outset. " Regardless of the route chosen, the Supreme Court vir-
tually always has the last say in a dispute between states.2s
B. The Compact Clause in Operation
Regardless of its shortcomings the states have often relied
upon the compact clause to accomplish a great number of di-
verse goals, many of which "may not call for, nor be capable of,
national treatment. s2  Notably, states have employed the com-
pact clause to allocate debt, 7 to establish an authority for the
any of the states' sovereign power has been delegated to the body established by the
compact. Id. The final consideration is whether the states may withdraw at will from the
compact. Id. Absent any of these conditions a compact does not enhance the states' po-
litical leverage and hence does not intrude upon the domain of Congress. The need for
approval is thus obviated in these circumstances. Accord Northeast Bancorp v. Board of
Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985).
23. If no compact has been agreed to, or if a compact does not specify the contrary,
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article III. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The
Constitution, however, describes the Court's jurisdiction in these matters solely in
nonexclusive terms; no mention of plenary jurisdiction is made. The language granting
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction, therefore, does not prevent Congress from as-
serting its own Article III powers and granting concurrent jurisdiction over these dis-
putes to the courts it is empowered to establish. Nevertheless, Congress, possibly because
of turmoil that might result from such an arrangement, has enacted legislation granting
exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in these instances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)
(1966).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. The Supreme Court has some discretion in deciding whether to hear cases
brought under § 1251. This discretion, however, seems to be limited to deciding the ap-
propriateness of the suit; i.e., it is limited to considerations of ripeness and standing,
rather than assessments of the merits, as when a writ of certiorari is considered. See
California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164, 168 (1982).
26. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 14, at 695.
27. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290, 321 (1906) (upholding the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to resolve questions regarding interstate compacts). The
"compact" in this case actually consisted of the Virginia enactment authorizing West
Virginia to establish itself as a state. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, W. VA. CONST. art. 8,
§ 8 (the provision of the West Virginia Constitution promising repayment of that por-
tion of Virginia's debt allocable to West Virginia); 12 Stat. 633 (1862) (the Act of Con-
gress recognizing the new state). According to some commentators on the subject, a com-
pact need not be a written document, but merely an understanding of some sort between
states as to a course of action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 9.5(a), at 300 (3d. ed. 1986). The Constitution itself seems to bear out
this distinction. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation. ... ) with U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No state
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operation of an interstate port,28 to provide for the construction
of a bridge spanning interstate waters,29 and to provide for the
extradition of felons.30 These possibilities are by no means
exhaustive.3
States have negotiated many compacts allocating the waters of
interstate rivers and streams.3 2  River allocation compacts,
though not unique to the western states s3 are most prevalent in
that region. The relative scarcity of water in the western United
States necessitated the use of many water conservation and allo-
cation measures, including the compact, to a far greater extent
than in other regions. For example, Texas alone has entered into
five separate water allocation compacts, each pertaining to dif-
ferent rivers and river systems.3 4
It seems clear, especially in light of the recent drought exper-
ienced throughout much of the nation,a" that water compacts
will become increasingly important in the years and decades to
shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power .... ").
28. New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921); 1921
N.J. Laws, ch. 151; 1921 N.Y. Laws, ch. 154.
29. Indiana-Kentucky Bridge Compact, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355-356 (1916); ch. 274, 44
Stat. 1337 (1927); ch. 370, 44 Stat. 1398 (1927); 1919 Ind. Acts, ch. 53; 1927 Ind. Acts, ch.
10; 1928 Ky. Acts, chs. 172, 174; see also Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930).
30. Agreement on Detainers, U.S., ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (1934); see also Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981). The Detainer compact is unusual in that Congress ratified it
first and allowed the states to join the pre-approved compact at their discretion. Id. at
441. Forty-six states have done so.
31. See generally, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGEN-
CIES (1983) (describing the uses to which interstate compacts have been put).
32. For a detailed list of water allocation compacts and their signatories current to
1983, see id.
33. See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact (Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania), Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); 53 Del. Laws 185, ch. 71 (1961);
1961 N.J. Laws 41, ch. 13; 1961 N.Y. Laws 794, ch. 148; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 815.101
(Purdon 1988).
34. Canadian River Compact (Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico), ch. 135, 64 Stat.
93 (1950) and ch. 306, 66 Stat. 74 (1952); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 526.1 (West 1970);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-2 (1978); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 43.006 (Vernon 1988). Pecos
River Compact (New Mexico and Texas) ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159 (1949); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-15-19 (1978); TEX WATER CODE ANN. § 42.010 (Vernon 1988). Red River Compact
(Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas), Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980);
1979 Ark. Acts 201; 1978 La. Acts 71; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1431 (West 1989); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 46.013 (Vernon 1988). Rio Grande Compact (Colorado, New Mex-
ico, and Texas), ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785 (1939); COLO. REV. STAT. § 73 (1939); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 75-34-3 (1953); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 41.009 (Vernon 1988). Sabine River
Compact (Louisiana and Texas), ch. 668, 68 Stat. 690 (1954); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 38:2329 (West 1989); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 44.010 (Vernon 1988). See generally
Elliott, Texas' Interstate Water Compacts, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1241 (1986).
35. Goodgame, supra note 1, at 16.
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come. 36 Unless a coherent scheme is devised to resolve compact
disputes quickly and easily, the continued use of the compact
mechanism will become futile. The ongoing Texas v. New Mex-
ico dispute before the Supreme Court provides a graphic exam-
ple of this futility.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF A MODERN
INTERSTATE COMPACT: Texas v. New Mexico
Like most contracts,37 the great majority of compacts function
as their signatories intend. Nevertheless, a water compact, like a
contract, may run afoul of its purpose and lead to litigation.
Compacts have failed as a result of 1) poor draftsmanship, 2)
lack of sufficient foresight by the compacting states, or 3) a com-
bination of the two. The controversy surrounding the Pecos
River Compact illustrates the third possible cause of failure. In
the Pecos River case, the flaw in the compact is so egregious that
the case has been before the Supreme Court twice for argument
and will return at least once more. This protracted litigation has
rendered the compact virtually useless.
A. A History of the Pecos River Compact Litigation
Desiring to apportion the waters of the Pecos River, the states
of Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Com-
pact.38 The arrangement failed to fulfill its promise and led to
litigation in the Supreme Court-litigation that has endured for
well over a decade and only now shows signs of abatement.
1. History of the compact- The Pecos River rises in East
Central New Mexico and flows through that state and through
Southwest Texas, discharging into the Rio Grande near Langtry,
Texas.3 9 The states of Texas and New Mexico elected to bind
themselves in a compact for its division, hoping to maximize the
36. See generally Peterson, Arizona to Cut Down on Greenery to Save Water, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1984, at A8, col. 2.
37. The Supreme Court has held a compact is a contract between states. Texas v.
New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (quoting Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
38. Pecos River Compact, 63 Stat. 159. For an in-depth examination of the early
stages of the litigation, see Comment, Texas v. New Mexico: The Pecos River Compact
Litigation, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 395 (1980).
39. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 556 (1983).
[VOL. 23:1
FALL 1989] Water Compact Adjudication
river's benefits to both. After some lengthy delays, including
Texas' failure to ratify an earlier agreement in 1925, the two
states ratified the Pecos River Compact in 1948, and Congress
approved it the next year.4
One of the prime functions of the compact was to furnish a
workable guide to the amount of water New Mexico owed Texas
in a given year. The most significant aspect of the Pecos River
Compact, however, was the creation of a three-member commis-
sion to administer the compact's terms. The compact empow-
ered each state to name one commissioner, each entitled to a
vote. In addition, the President might also name one commis-
sioner, possessing no vote but acting as chair.41 The compact re-
quired the commission to "'[e]ngage in studies of water supplies
of the Pecos River' and to '[c]ollect, analyze, correlate, preserve
and report on data as to the stream flows, storage, diversions,
salvage, and use of the waters of the Pecos River and its
tributaries.' 42
Significantly, the structure of the Compact Commission re-
quired that any action taken receive the consent of both voting
commissioners. 3 Presumably, the two states failed to foresee
that an issue where they could not reach agreement would arise.
40. Id. at 557-59.
Among other things, the Compact established the amount of water owed by New Mex-
ico to Texas each year from New Mexico's portion of the river. The compact defined this
amount in terms of the "1947 Condition." This was, in essence, an expression of the
percentage of total water in New Mexico's portion of the stream that it was bound to
deliver to Texas regardless of the total water in the Pecos. This percentage was based
upon a study completed in 1947. New Mexico, therefore, was not bound to deliver an
absolute amount each year but rather an amount based upon the amount of water in the
basin that year. See Pecos River Compact, 63 Stat. 159, art. III (allocating water accord-
ing to the 1947 study), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 109, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949) [here-
inafter S. Doc. No. 109]; Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 558 n.4.
41. The President has the option to appoint a federal commissioner, who is charged
with presiding over meetings of the commission, albeit without a vote. Pecos River Com-
pact, 63 Stat. 159, art. V(a); S. Doc. No. 109, supra note 40, at 5.
The other Texas water compacts feature similar structures. Canadian River Compact,
66 Stat. 74 (providing for one commissioner per state and one non-voting federal com-
missioner); Red River Compact, 94 Stat. 3305, (providing for two commissioners per
state and one non-voting federal commissioner); Rio Grande Compact, 53 Stat. 785 (pro-
viding for one commissioner per state and one non-voting federal commissioner); Sabine
River Compact, 68 Stat. 690 (providing for two commissioners per state and one non-
voting federal commissioner). Most other water compacts provide for a federal commis-
sioner's presence as well.
42. 462 U.S. at 560 (quoting Pecos River Compact, 63 Stat. 159, art. V(d)(3)-(4)).
43. Id. Other water allocation compacts have employed the unanimous consent provi-
sion as well. See, e.g., Canadian River Compact, 64 Stat. 93 (requiring each of the three
voting commissioners to approve of actions); Rio Grande Compact, 53 Stat. 785 (requir-
ing approval of each of three state-appointed commissioners). But see, e.g., Red River
Compact, 94 Stat. 3305 (mandating that six of eight voting commissioners approve).
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This piece of poor drafting, by creating the conditions for an
insoluble impasse," eventually led Texas to the Supreme Court
in search of relief.
2. History of the litigation- Following its ratification in
1948 and congressional approval in 1949, the Compact Commis-
sion performed as envisioned for about fifteen years."5 This pe-
riod of seeming goodwill, however, belied the very real difficul-
ties experienced by the Commission in administering the
compact. The basis of the compact's apportionment scheme, the
1947 Condition, contained flaws that rendered the accurate
gauging of the river's true flow rate virtually impossible, under-
stating the flow by a significant amount. Correspondingly, as the
Commission later determined, the amount of water delivered at
the state line each year fell far short of the compact require-
ments."6 Despite efforts on the part of both states to revise the
assumptions of the original engineering report, the amounts of
water delivered by New Mexico at the state line continued to
fall short of the specified amounts until the early 1970s. The
failure of the states to agree to the actual amount of the
shortfalls, if any,47 created an impasse between the two commis-
sioners and a stalemate on issues presented to the commission.
Texas responded to the deadlock by initiating a suit in the
United States Supreme Court in 1974, alleging that New Mexico
had breached its obligation to deliver water under article III of
the Pecos River Compact."'
Following Texas' invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction,49 the Court assigned the case to a special master for
a hearing of the evidence, as is the Court's custom in cases
44. Indeed, the Special Master in his 1979 Report expressed doubts as to whether the
compact could ever be workable given its structure. Comment, supra note 38, at 410
(quoting REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, Texas v. New Mexico (1979) [hereinafter SPE-
CIAL MASTER'S 1979 REPORT]).
45. 462 U.S. at 560.
46. Id. at 560-61. The Commission determined in a 1962 study that the cumulative
shortfall for the years 1950-1961 was approximately 53,000 acre-feet. Id. An acre-foot is
the unit of measurement denoting the volume of water necessary to cover an acre to a
uniform depth of one foot. This is roughly 325,000 gallons. Goodgame, supra note 1, at
16 n*.
47. Texas wanted the Court to analyze the shortfalls in terms of the Double Mass
Analysis method devised by Texas to measure inflows to the Pecos over a three-year
period. The Court declined, adopting New Mexico's view that Texas' system did not fall
within the guidelines established by the compact. Hence the Court itself, even if it de-
sired to, could not adopt Texas' plan. 462 U.S. at 571-74.
48. Id. at 562.
49. The Supreme Court will not automatically hear interstate dispute cases, despite
its original and exclusive jurisdiction in these matters. See supra note 25. The "model
case . . . is a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus
[VOL. 23:1
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where it has been called upon not only to settle questions of law
but also to find fact. After producing a technical report address-
ing the proper method of measuring the actual flow of the
river,50 the special master produced a report in 1982 recom-
mending that the Court utilize its equitable powers to appoint a
tiebreaker, whose decision would be "final, subject only to ap-
propriate review by the Court. '51
The United States, as intervenor, and the State of New Mex-
ico excepted to this recommendation and the Court sustained
their exceptions.52 In so holding, the Court noted that the com-
pact, by virtue of its approval by Congress, no longer possessed
the attributes of a mere contract. Had Congress not granted its
approval to the compact, the Court might equitably have modi-
fied the agreement and, for example, inserted a tiebreaker, as it
might have done were the compact an ordinary contract between
the states. Once Congress acted favorably upon the compact,
however, it was transformed into a validly enacted law that the
Court could not modify.53
The 1983 opinion in Texas v. New Mexico, therefore, clearly
articulates the Court's view that any potential remedy to the dif-
ficulties encountered in the administration of the Pecos River
Compact must be limited to that contemplated within the com-
pact itself.54 On that basis, the Court remanded the case to the
special master to determine whether New Mexico had actually
breached its obligations under article III(a) of the compact.53
On remand, the special master conducted the hearings and
concluded that New Mexico had not fulfilled its obligations to
Texas, and thus, had breached the compact. The master's find-
ings of fact revealed that from 1950 to 1983, New Mexico wrong-
fully had denied Texas approximately 340,100 acre-feet of
water.56 The master then recommended that New Mexico com-
belli if the States were fully sovereign." Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 571 n.18 (cita-
tions omitted).
50. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 446 U.S. 540 (1980) (approving SPECIAL MASTER'S
1979 Report, supra note 44, concerning river flow measurement).
51. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 563 (quoting REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
Texas v. New Mexico 26 (1982) [hereinafter SPECIAL MASTER'S 1982 REPORT]).
52. Id. at 564.
53. Id. (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (holding that congressionally
approved Interstate Detainer Compact has the force and effect of federal law)). More-
over, the states and Congress might have provided for alternative methods of resolving
disputes between the states, even to the extent of foreclosing Supreme Court review. See
id. at 568-69; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, § 9.5(b), at 303.
54. 462 U.S. at 568-71.
55. Id. at 576.
56. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1987).
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pensate Texas for the accumulated shortfall by delivering one-
tenth of that amount each year for ten years, in addition to its
normal requirements.5
The Court, however, did not agree that specific performance
constituted the only possible relief available-the Court saw
nothing to preclude an award of damages should it be deter-
mined that the legal remedy was more appropriate. The Su-
preme Court noted that the contractual nature of the compact
permitted damages for past breaches as well as prospective re-
lief.5s Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the special
master yet again to determine the merits of each of the possible
remedies. 9
B. An Examination of Possible Remedies Available to the
Court for the Breach of an Interstate Water Compact
Each remedy the Court might impose in Texas v. New Mexico
presents both advantages and disadvantages. This section will
examine both monetary damages and specific performance,
weighing each for its suitability in resolving the dispute between
Texas and New Mexico.
1. Monetary Damages- One avenue open to the Court in
Texas v. New Mexico involves levying damages against New
Mexico for its failure to deliver adequate supplies of water to
Texas.60 The imposition of damages against New Mexico would
compensate Texas for the damage to its economy and its citizens
57. Id. at 128. The Special Master declined to award monetary damages, cohcluding
that "the Compact contemplated delivery of water and that the Court could not order
relief inconsistent with the Compact terms." Id. at 130; see also REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER, Texas v. New Mexico 31-32 (1986) [hereinafter SPECIAL MASTER'S 1986 REPORT]
(copy on file with Government Documents Librarian, University of Michigan Law School
Library).
58. 482 U.S. at 132. It is noteworthy that the Court is unwilling to invoke equity to
reform the "contract"-a statutory enactment-but says that specific performance, itself
an equitable remedy, is entirely appropriate. The compact's nature as a positive enact-
ment of law probably explains this dichotomy. Rather than commanding specific per-
formance, the Court would actually be issuing an order similar to mandamus.
59. Id. at 130 & n.8.
60. See SPECIAL MASTER'S 1986 REPORT, supra note 57, at 31-32. Not only does the
compact itself not foreclose monetary relief, see supra text accompanying note 58, previ-
ous decisions of the Court have upheld the "propriety of money judgments against a
state in an original action." 482 U.S. at 130 (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S.
565 (1918) (holding damages applicable in the case of a breached interstate compact);
South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (awarding South Dakota damages
for North Carolina's failure to redeem bond obligations); and United States v. Michigan,
190 U.S. 379 (1903)).
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caused by New Mexico's breach of the compact's terms. More-
over, a damage award could accomplish this substantive good
without adversely affecting the water supply of users on New
Mexico's stretch of the river, as would be the case were New
Mexico forced to "pay" water to Texas." New Mexico could
purchase compliance with the compact without harming its own
residents, who rely on a continued source of water.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals distinct flaws in this ap-
proach. A lump sum payment to the State of Texas by the State
of New Mexico would do little to benefit those most harmed by
the thirty-year cumulative shortfall.2 The region most greatly
affected by New Mexico's breach of the compact constitutes a
small portion of Texas.63 Assuming that any damages awarded
are absorbed into the state's general operating budget these in-
dividuals would receive only a small portion of the benefits ob-
tained as a result of a lump sum payment. 4
Practical and legal difficulties, however, preclude an attempt
to compensate directly those individuals and businesses ad-
versely affected by New Mexico's breach. The shortfalls created
by the breach have occurred over the span of three decades. The
very length of time may preclude full compensation of those who
at one time or another were affected by New Mexico's noncom-
pliance.66 Some may have left the area and prove impossible to
locate, and others may have died. Businesses in operation at
some time during New Mexico's breach may no longer exist, per-
haps even as the result of insufficient water.
Moreover, it is not necessarily certain that an award of dam-
ages that is distributed to affected citizens would pass constitu-
tional muster. Ordinarily, the eleventh amendment forbids a cit-
izen from suing a state unless the state waives its immunity.6
61. For a more complete discussion of the impact of water damages on the environs
of New Mexico within the watershed of the Pecos, see Joint Brief of Amici Curiae, The
Incorporated Municipalities of Alamgordo, Artesia, Capitan, Pecos, Roswell, Ruidoso,
Ruidoso Downs and Santa Rosa, New Mexico in Support of the State of New Mexico at
4-6, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65) [hereinafter JOINT BRIEF].
62. 482 U.S. 131-32.
63. The total area of the Pecos River watershed in Texas is approximately 15,768
square miles. Interview with Bob Johnson, Section Chief, Water Rights Administrative
Section, Texas Water Comm'n, Austin, Texas, March 30, 1989. The area of Texas, by
contrast, is 266,807 square miles. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (1988).
64. 482 U.S. at 132 n.7.
65. SPECIAL MASTER'S 1986 REPORT, supra note 57, at 31.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Some commentators note that a state may waive its im-
munity solely by engaging in activities subject to federal regulation. They conclude, how-
ever, that it is unlikely that a waiver will be found unless the activity is "admittedly
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This prohibition presumably extends to suits where the state,
acting in its capacity as parens patriae, asserts the rights of its
citizens against another state. In cases where states have sued
another state, not in its own right, but on the right of its citi-
zens, the Supreme Court has suggested that the suing state's
motives must be carefully scrutinized."
A final reason for finding monetary damages unsatisfactory is
that the imposition of monetary damages would destroy any in-
centive New Mexico might have to comply with the compact in
the future." In times of plentiful water, New Mexico would have
no reason not to grant Texas its fair share of the waters of the
Pecos. New Mexico's willingness to comply with the terms of the
compact, however, is likely to be directly proportional to the to-
tal available supply of water. In times of drought, New Mexico
could hardly be expected to supply irreplaceable water to Texas
when it can "purchase" compliance. New Mexico would always
substitute money for water in times of shortage, as the latter is
more precious to it. 9 A remedy that substitutes money for water
clearly frustrates congressional intent, for Congress has stated
that it intends the compact to provide for the equitable distribu-
tion of the present available water supply. °
2. Specific Performance- As another alternative, the Su-
preme Court could order New Mexico to fulfill its back-obliga-
tions under the terms of the compact. A remedy of specific per-
formance has several advantages. Texas would receive what it
bargained for under the compact-water. Moreover, "water
damages" 71 would inure directly to the benefit of those adversely
affected by the shortfalls. Specific performance would also avoid
the possibility of placing New Mexico in the disconcerting posi-
tion of having to raise additional revenues for the payment of
subject to federal regulations and . . . not [an] essential state function." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 27, § 2.11, at 53. The allocation of water does not
appear to satisfy either of these requirements.
67. See Snap v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 612 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). But see Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130 (contending that any dam-
ages awarded to Texas would not violate the spirit of the eleventh amendment) (dicta).
68. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 132.
69. But see id. (ignoring obligation to deliver water not a substantial concern in light
of the "authority to order remedying shortfalls to be made up in kind").
70. S. Doc. No. 109, supra note 40, at 3.
71. This is the term used to designate specific performance of the compact. The Su-
preme Court uses the term "water interest" to denote the payment of accrued shortfalls
in kind rather than in the form of monetary compensation. Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
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damages.72 New Mexico could satisfy the compact by opening
the sluice gates on a few dams. The special master, perhaps find-
ing these arguments persuasive, in addition to believing that the
Supreme Court could not order money damages.in this case, rec-
ommended that the Court order water damages.73
Regardless of the strength of the arguments in favor of that
remedy, the distinct disadvantages of specific performance prob-
ably more than offset the benefits. Specific performance of a
contract is an extraordinary remedy, which the Court has stated
it will employ only if equitable. 7 The Supreme Court must
therefore first find that a money judgment would not put the
parties in the best possible position. Additionally, enforcement
of the compact's terms must not "involve disproportionate hard-
ship to the defendant."75
As discussed above, a money judgment would not fully satisfy
Texas' claim against New Mexico. 76 This factor militates in
favor of specific performance. On the other hand, large areas of
the Pecos Valley in New Mexico have developed since 1947, the
effective date of the compact. Residents and businesses gravi-
tated to the area on the supposition that a ready source of water
would remain available for their use. This supposition was, in
turn, implicitly premised on the assumption that New Mexico
had complied with the terms of the compact and that Texas
would make no additional claims on the river's waters. The
Court, however, found that New Mexico had not complied with
the terms of the compact.77 As a result, large areas of east cen-
tral New Mexico may be faced with a serious water crisis if the
Court orders restitutionary water deliveries, 78 and, the expecta-
tions of residents and businesses will have been breached.79
Viewed in this light, a decree of specific performance certainly
causes "disproportionate harm" to New Mexico. At the very
least, this draws into question the equity of such a decree.
Specific performance might not be a panacea for Texas either.
Texas does appear to have more than adequate reservoir capac-
72. This was one of the concerns voiced by the Supreme Court in its various Virginia
v. West Virginia opinions. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 592 (1918);
Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290, 318-19 (1907).
73. SPECIAL MASTER'S 1986 REPORT, supra note 57, at 31-32.
74. 482 U.S. at 131.
75. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1136, at 95 (1964) (footnote omitted).
76. See discussion supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
77. See discussion supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
78. See JOINT BRIEF, supra note 61, at 6.
79. Id.
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ity to handle larger water deliveries.80 It is unlikely, however,
that the water, if stored, would benefit many of those harmed by
non-delivery in the past."' Ability to store water, alone, will not
make whole those who required the water in the past and were
unable to obtain it.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION
The Supreme Court faces a Hobson's Choice. It may award
monetary damages to Texas, a step that would benefit the state
but fail to compensate the true victims. Choosing monetary
damages would also provide further disincentive to New Mexico
to comply with the literal terms of the compact requiring the
delivery of water. On the other hand, were the Court to order
specific performance, Texas would perhaps receive its due, but
the citizens of New Mexico would suffer greatly in the execution
of judgment. This dilemma easily might have been avoided had
the drafters of the compact foreseen the implications of a dead-
lock and acted to prevent it.
In the sections to follow, three possible solutions to the
Court's dilemma are suggested. These solutions are dispute reso-
lution systems that might be built into the compact itself, defus-
ing controversies before litigation becomes necessary. The pri-
mary benefit would be to expedite the process of allocating
interstate waters. None of them, of course, will be of any use in
resolving Texas v. New Mexico, which has already proceeded
past the point where such alternatives to conventional litigation
would be useful. Nevertheless, Congress might profit from the
lessons of that case and employ one of the alternatives in future
compacts it is asked to ratify. 2
The three possible solutions are 1) requiring that the compact
provide for a federal commissioner who would cast a tie-break-
ing vote when the compact commission is otherwise dead-
locked;8 3 2) establishing a federal agency that would have powers
80. SPECIAL MASTER'S 1986 REPORT, supra note 57, at 42.
81. This parallels the concerns articulated supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
82. This assumes an activist role on the part of Congress. Water compact legislation
to date frequently resembles private legislation with little regard for the national inter-
ests at stake. See generally S. Doc. No. 109, supra note 40; see also 132 CONG. REC.
12,326-01 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Cranston on proposed Nevada-California Compact). In
the future members of Congress must recognize the public-law nature of these compacts
and appreciate the gravity of the situation they are asked to legislate upon.
83. This Note contemplates a compact similar to the Pecos River Compact-a bilat-
eral agreement with each side supplying one commissioner to the compact commission.
This discussion would apply with equal force, however, to other types of compact com-
mission structures. as long as a tie is nossible in a vote on commission action.
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analogous to those of the Supreme Court to equitably apportion
interstate waters; and 3) requiring that all future water alloca-
tion compacts contain clauses binding the signatories to seek ar-
bitration before resorting to the Supreme Court. Each of these
options will be examined in turn, focusing on the relative advan-
tages and disadvantages.
A. Federal Tiebreaker
The idea of "tiebreaking" a deadlocked compact is not new.
The Supreme Court was presented with this possibility in 1983
in Texas v. New Mexico.8 The Court declined the invitation to
cast a tie-breaking vote, citing the compact's status as congres-
sionally enacted legislation. The Court noted that this would
amount to a usurpation of the legislative process.8" Congress,
however, as the enactor of laws, may impose such terms as it
sees fit prior to authorizing a specific compact."6 Congress has
shown no reluctance to employ similar tie-breaking procedures
for various federal commissions structurally comparable to a
compact commission. 7 The question thus becomes not "Can
Congress provide for a tiebreaker?" but rather, "Should Con-
gress do so?"
1. Advantages inherent in a federal tiebreaker system-
The most obvious advantage of a federally imposed tiebreaker is
the elimination of a compact commission deadlock. Moreover, a
tie-breaking mechanism would entail only minimal deviation
84. The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to create a tiebreaker in
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1983), but, as indicated supra text accompa-
nying notes 51-53, declined to do so. This device has, however, been adopted in several
compacts. See, e.g., Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145, 149-51 (1949), Snake
River Compact, 62 Stat. 294 (1943), and Yellowstone River Compact, ch. 629, 65 Stat.
663, 665-66 (1951).
85. 462 U.S. at 554, 564-65.
86. "It can hardly be doubted that in giving consent Congress may impose condi-
tions." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937); see also Act of Dec. 21,
1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (imposing conditions on Colorado River Compact before Con-
gress would consent to its approval); V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION, A STUDY OF
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT 74-75 (1953).
87. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5347(e) (1982) (establishing chairman of Federal Prevailing
Rate Advisory Committee as tiebreaking vote); 7 U.S.C. § 2327(a) (1982) (allowing chair-
man of Plant Variety Protection Board a vote only in case of a tie).
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from current practice.8 Congress merely would have to insist
that, as a condition of approval, all future compacts must pro-
vide for a federal commissioner who would be allowed to vote, at
the very least, whenever the states have reached an impasse.
Nor would a tiebreaker impose additional efficiency costs
upon the compact signatories. Most water compacts to date have
provided for the appointment of a commissioner by the federal
government, in most cases by the President.8 9 There is no reason
to believe this practice will change. Thus, in the majority of in-
stances, a federal commissioner already would be privy to the
relevant data. This would mitigate the need for the states to
present additional facts.
Finally, the federally appointed commissioner likely would be
free of the partisan concerns that caused the initial deadlock,
particularly if the commissioner is not a resident of the com-
pacting states.9 A congressional requirement that commission-
ers, to be qualified for such service, may not reside in the com-
pacting states would help to ensure that the actions taken are
objective and equitable. An impartial nonresident federal com-
missioner would prevent one state from dominating the commis-
sion merely because the federal commissioner, as a resident of
that state, has an interest in the outcome of the dispute.
2. Disadvantages inherent in the tiebreaker system- Not-
withstanding the advantages, a federal tiebreaker might not be
the best solution to compact commission deadlocks. Many ex-
isting water compacts cite the equitable apportionment of a
given river's waters as their primary purpose.9 The establish-
ment of a tiebreaking procedure might not present the most effi-
cacious means by which to accomplish that end. The federal
commissioner, by casting the tie-breaking vote on a given issue,
may prevent the commission from binding itself in an inextrica-
ble knot. This might, however, be done at considerable cost to
the compact's stated goal of equitable water apportionment. The
federal commissioner, as here envisioned, must commit himself
to only one position regardless of the equities of the other. Con-
88. Most compacts already provide for a federal official to act as nonvoting chairman
of the compact commission. Each water allocation compact to which Texas is a party, for
example, contains a provision of this sort. See supra note 41.
89. Id.
90. This is particularly true if the federal commissioner is not "a domiciliary of or
[does not] reside in either State." Sabine River Compact, 68 Stat. 690, art. V(b).
91. See, e.g., Pecos River Compact, 63 Stat. 159, art. I ("major purposes of this com-
pact are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters
of the Pecos"); see also Red River Compact, 94 Stat. 3305, preamble; Rio Grande Com-
pact, 53 Stat. 785, preamble; Sabine River Compact, 68 Stat. 690, preamble.
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cededly, a situation where neither alternative presented to a
compact commission is palatable might occur only infrequently.
Nevertheless, as amply demonstrated by the protracted litiga-
tion over the Pecos River Compact in Texas v. New Mexico,
such situations do arise.
The shift in control over interstate rivers resulting from a fed-
eral tiebreaker's presence also presents difficulties under the
posited tiebreaker system. Under a system utilizing a federal
tiebreaker, the effective power to allocate the river's waters
passes from the states, which have traditionally held this
power,92 to the federal government, in the person of the federal
commissioner. In times of plentiful water, one would anticipate
no real dispute arising between the states. Ties would not de-
velop in the usual case, and the commission would function
smoothly. When, however, water has become scarce, there is an
ever-increasing likelihood that the states will not be able to
agree upon a course of action. The incentive for cooperation in
the administration of the compact diminishes greatly and dead-
locks become increasingly likely. The federal commissioner, as
tiebreaker, assumes increasing importance. Ideally under the
tiebreaker scheme, the federal commissioner would not be in-
fected with local prejudices. By the same token, however, the
commissioner may not possess an adequate sense of local con-
cerns. As a result, the commissioner, who was appointed to re-
present the interests of the federal government on the compact
commission, holds the real power over the fate of the river sys-
tem. The power not only shifts away from the states at the time
they are most in need of it, but the new wielder of power may
lack a sufficient comity of interest with those affected by her de-
cision to make up for its loss.
A federal tiebreaker, therefore, does not solve the problem. Al-
though this device would ameliorate many of the difficulties as-
sociated with bilateral water compacts, a tiebreaker also seems
to raise as many issues as it answers. Other devices must be ex-
amined to see if they might prove more beneficial in the long
run.
B. Federal Water Agency
Another possible solution lies in the creation of a federal
water agency. Congress could establish this agency along the
92. See supra note 8.
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lines of the traditional administrative model, for example the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 3 Like the NLRB, the
hypothetical "Federal Water Agency" would hear disputes, sit-
ting as an administrative law tribunal.9 4
On its face a proposal for a water agency does not appear to
be a significant improvement over the existing method of resolv-
ing water disputes. Hearings before administrative personnel
would still be time-consuming. The states would still be forced
to assume a litigative posture, with the concomitant costs
involved.
One change to the NLRB-type structure could reduce the
time required. Rather than insisting upon typical adversarial
proceedings, Congress might ordain that the states proceed on a
non-adversarial basis. This would allow the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) to conduct her own independent investigation of
the claims made.9 5 Water compact disputes often turn on ques-
tions of fact, so arguments of law might remain adversarial with-
out fear that the states would unduly skew the proceedings.
The nonadversarial process of factual development would be
appropriate in these cases for several compelling reasons. The
gravity of the issue requires a method of developing facts that
will most likely lead to a just and equitable division of water.
Moreover, the parties in these cases are on relatively equal foot-
93. The National Labor Relations Board model was chosen because labor relations
law provides a situation analogous to interstate water law. Labor law was once the exclu-
sive domain of the common law courts. During the early part of this century, however, it
was recognized that it would be simpler to handle labor cases through an administrative
agency, subject to the oversight of the federal courts. This procedure was adopted piece-
meal until the administrative structure emerged in its present form after the passage in
1935 of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See generally R.
SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(6th ed. 1979).
Similarly, water disputes between states have been adjudicated by the courts. Strong
arguments, however, support the contention that an administrative agency could better
dispose of these cases. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 101 (1988) (statements of Procedure of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and associated entities). Basically, this would involve a preliminary hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1988) (should
either party disagree with the findings of the ALJ, the decision might then be reviewed
by the agency head or a commission) with 29 CFR § 101.12 (1988) (only after exhausting
the administrative process could the parties bring suit in the Supreme Court).
95. For a favorable critique of this system, see Langbein, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 833-35 (1985). The states might still be able to
skew the proceedings because they control the source of information available to the
administrative fact finder. This argument, however, ignores the presence of the federal
commissioner, who would be ideally suited to making an objective presentation of the
facts. Although this elevates the status of the federal commissioner, it does not grant the
commissioner the objectionably broad decision-making powers discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 91-92.
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ing and are among the most sophisticated of litigants. The need
for the safeguards that the adversary system provides civil liti-
gants is thus much reduced. 6 Additionally, expert triers of fact
could supply their own peculiar knowledge of water allocation
issues to the situation, placing them in a better position to accu-
rately gauge the merits of each side's position.
In light of these considerations, "water board" adjudication
would be superior to Supreme Court adjudication in two ways.
The board would possess expertise that the Court lacks.9 This
contention is probably true of many, if not most, of the subjects
the Court must deal with; parties whose economic vitality may
depend on a knowledgeable decision, however, should not have
to depend on a nonexpert body if a suitable alternative exists.
The agency format would also be better than the use of special
masters. The master, employed by the Supreme Court to evalu-
ate highly technical matters in those cases in which it sits as a
trial court, is nonetheless hampered by the adversarial mode of
evidence production. The master is limited to-making a determi-
nation on the basis of the facts presented to him. A nonadver-
sarial process, where the finder of fact controls all facets of the
evidence production process,98 on the other hand, could lead to a
fuller development of the evidence and produce more equitable
results. Interests may thus be represented that might otherwise
be ignored if the states themselves are permitted to control the
process.
As desirable as those results appear, however, there seems to
be little likelihood that Congress would consider this proposal
seriously. The adversary process is well entrenched in our legal
system.99 Congress has moved with the greatest of caution in ac-
cepting even the most limited of encroachments on the adver-
96. Currently, when a case comes before the Supreme Court on original jurisdiction,
the Court will assign the case to a special master to develop findings of fact and prelimi-
nary findings of law rather than holding a trial itself. The parties may take exception to
the findings. The Court will then consider both the master's findings and any exception
to them and render judgment on that basis. It may choose, as it did in Texas v. New
Mexico, to remand the case to the special master for additional findings of fact. See
supra note 59.
97. Cf. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972) (noting the
inherent disability suffered by the courts in analyzing complex fact situations).
98. The closest possible analog to this example in current use in the United States is
the grand jury. See 18 U.S.C. § 3332 (1982) (providing for the ability to compel
evidence).
99. See Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85
MicH. L. REV. 734, 742-47 (1987).
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sarial ideal in its own domain, the statutory federal courts. 1'0 It
is, therefore, unlikely that it would relegate water disputes, a
subject area that has long endured within the adversary arena,
to a unique forum as contemplated here.
Even were Congress more visibly receptive to the nonadver-
sarial fact-finding concept, the idea would probably face a stiff
challenge from various vested interests. The states, for instance,
have traditionally held some measure of control over the alloca-
tion of interstate waters and streams, and would not be likely to
approve of an agency of the sort contemplated here. Although
state disapproval should theoretically provide no impediment to
Congress's enactment of this concept, in practice the states
would probably be able to exercise enough political leverage to
block passage of any bill of this sort.
Finally, the current trend in government indicates tighter fis-
cal management. It appears unlikely that Congress would estab-
lish a new agency to accomplish what is already handled by the
courts, no matter how poorly.
C. Arbitration Clause
The third possible solution to the compact deadlock problem
lies in congressional approval of interstate water compacts sub-
ject to the inclusion of an arbitration clause. Under such a
scheme, Congress would require each interstate compact to con-
tain a provision similar to that found in the Sabine River
Compact: 10
In the case of a tie vote on any of the [commission's] de-
terminations, orders or other actions subject to arbitra-
tion, then arbitration shall be a condition precedent to
any right of legal action. Either side of a tie vote may,
upon request, submit the question to arbitration. If there
shall be arbitration there shall be three arbitrators: one
named in writing by each side, and the third chosen by
the two arbitrators so elected. If the arbitrators fail to
100. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(5) (providing for judicial intervention in the dis-
covery process only "after the attorney making the motion has made a reasonable effort
to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion").
The Advisory Committee stated that it thought motions under this provision would not
"be made routinely". Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note.
101. Ch. 668, 68 Stat. 690 (1954).
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select a third within ten days, then he shall be chosen by
the Representative of the United States."0 2
Among the principal difficulties inherent in Supreme Court
litigation of water allocation issues are the extremely burden-
some costs, both in terms of funds consumed and the time in-
volved. 103 In a case such as Texas v. New Mexico, the parties
may spend more than a decade and hundreds of thousands of
dollars seeking a solution. The parties must petition the Court
to assume jurisdiction over the case, make the requisite
presentations to a special master, and might then have to file
briefs and argue before the Court itself if the master's report
contains findings to which they object.
As an alternative, however, "[a]rbitration is often a valuable
tool in stabilizing ongoing contractual relationships because it
can often provide a final result in less time and with less expense
than required for protracted litigation."' 4 In the commercial
sector, federal policy supports arbitration, 0 5 and Congress af-
firmed its support for the procedure via the Federal Arbitration
Act, encouraging arbitration to the maximum extent possible.'
The advantages of arbitration in the commercial sector might
be equally obtainable in the water dispute setting. Arbitration
might then prove to be a suitable alternative to protracted liti-
gation in the Supreme Court. The first obvious advantage lies in
the speed with which an issue may be resolved in the arbitration
forum. Unlike a hearing before the Supreme Court, which re-
quires an extensive delay between the time of petition for as-
sumption of jurisdiction and the actual hearing, arbitration
102. See id. Sabine River Compact, 68 Stat. 690 at art. VII(j). Although the Sabine
River Compact is one of the few compacts that has adopted an arbitration system for the
resolution of compact commission deadlock, this clause has never been used. This may
be attributed to the abundance of water in this particular river. Interview with Max
Forbes, Commission Secretary, Sabine River Compact (Feb. 8, 1988). Thus, while it is
not possible to study empirically the benefits that may accrue from this arbitration
clause, it is still possible to hypothesize as to probable advantages and disadvantages.
See also Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-222, 71 Stat. 497 (1957); CAL.
WATER CODE § 5900 (West 1971); Or. Rev. Stat. § 542.610 (1959).
103. The costs incurred by the special master alone have been extremely high-so
high as to merit a stinging dissent from Justice Blackmun when the Supreme Court
granted an order allowing those costs. Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 953, 953 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from order granting costs). At that time, the expenses claimed
by the special master throughout the entire litigation amounted to over $175,000.
104. Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Neb. 1976).
105. Fuller v. Guthrie, 565 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1977) (involving Arlo Guthrie).
106. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982). This Act provides that a party to an agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause may petition the federal courts for its enforcement as long
as the other jurisdictional requirements for those courts are met. Id. at § 4.
FALL 1989]
Journal of Law Reform
might occur within a matter of weeks, if not days. The arbitra-
tion panel need only be convened for the hearings to begin.
Moreover, the actual proceedings are far simpler. Compared to
the elaborate briefs, joint appendices, reply briefs, and other
paraphernalia required by the Supreme Court for its adjudica-
tions, arbitration proceedings are the essence of simplicity. One
experienced labor arbitrator has noted that the record might
only consist of depositions taken prior to the arbitration. The
briefs may then be taken straight from those depositions."'
Briefs in water compact cases might depend upon technical fac-
tual development to a greater extent than labor cases do, requir-
ing briefs based upon data in addition to depositions. These re-
quirements are, however, comparatively insignificant when
contrasted with the requirements for a case presented before the
Supreme Court. Oral argument is informal, if required at all.0 8
Furthermore, the states will, in all likelihood, choose the arbi-
tration panel for its expertise in the area of water allocation and
management. Any special master appointed by the Supreme
Court is also undoubtedly chosen for expertise in a particular
field, but his findings are reviewed by a panel of nonex-
perts-the Supreme Court. The same shackles that bind a spe-
cial master do not, however, bind an arbitration panel. It need
not tailor its decision to fit legal precedent. The panel's only
constraints are the four corners of the compact, which ideally
should provide all necessary guidance.0 9
In addition to time and cost savings and procedural efficiency
gains, compact arbitration clauses would present certain other
advantages. Adjudication would not necessarily result in an "all-
or-nothing" verdict for either party. An arbitration clause could
quite conceivably instruct the arbitrators to "split the differ-
ence" between each state's position to achieve the most equita-
107. R. Borovoy, Remarks on Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute
Resolution (ADR) at the First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, reprinted in 100 F.R.D. 499, 527-28 (1983).
108. Id. at 529.
109. Even in the less than ideal situation where the express terms of the contract
do not appear to cover the situation, the arbitrator should attempt to reach a solution
that harmonizes with the purpose of the contract. See Note, Labor
Law-Arbitration-Arbitrator Exceeds Authority by Reading Requirements for Pro-
gressive Discipline into Labor Agreements-County College of Morris Staff Association
v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985), 17 SETON HALL L. REV.
307, 315 (1987) (applying to the labor context). An arbitral decision may be said to be
within the essence of a contract-or in this case, a compact-if the decision has a "ra-
tionally infexable basis in the purpose of the agreement." Id. at 315-16 n.49 (citing
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry. 415 F.2d 403, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
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ble result. If both states presented the arbitrators with unrea-
sonable requests, nothing would prevent the panel from crafting
an equitable award.
Arbitration would also further Congress's implicit goal of per-
mitting the states to exercise primary control over water alloca-
tion matters. Federal power would only be exercised in the event
both states are ultimately unable to agree, first as to a course of
action and then as to a third arbitrator. Only then would the
federal government become involved, in the person of the fed-
eral commissioner, who would choose the third arbitrator. The
intervention of the federal government would thus be two deci-
sional steps removed from the process.
In many ways, this mirrors the commonly held image of fed-
eral-state relations. In those areas in which the states may claim
some sovereignty, the states may exercise power. When the
states prove unable to exercise their dominion over a subject
area in which either state or central government can act, how-
ever, the federal government may properly step in and assume
the task."' A required compact arbitration clause would recog-
nize and codify this fact.
These advantages do not imply that an arbitration clause is a
cure-all, however. There are potential drawbacks. One disadvan-
tage is the non-lawyer status of the arbitrators."' There are un-
deniably lawyers who are experts in water law. Many cases aris-
ing from interstate water compacts would turn on the facts in
light of the legal standards, however, and not upon questions of
purely legal significance. Although the task of an arbitrator is to
adjudicate a claim, a task for which lawyers are trained, the
need is greater for individuals schooled in the hydrological sci-
ences than in the law.
Another concern expressed about arbitration, at least as em-
ployed in the labor setting, is that it might deny the parties due
process rights." 2 This, it is claimed, can occur in two manners.
The first is that the parties often do not seek counsel to re-
present them before the arbitration panel.' This may be
110. See J. Madison, Resolutions Proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention, re-
printed in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, at 21 (M. Farrand ed.) (1937)
("to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent").
111. See Willig, Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances: Arbitral and Judicial
Competence Compared, reprinted in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING
ROLES-PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF AR-
BITRATORS, at 110-11 (discussing competence of arbitrators to adjudicate complex legal
claims).
112. Id. at 112-13.
113. Id. at 112.
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quickly dismissed, however, because the context in which that
argument is framed-labor disputes-is so dissimilar from that
posed here as to be irrelevant. It seems extremely unlikely that a
state with as much at risk as it would have in a water dispute of
this magnitude would proceed without counsel, as might an ill-
informed labor-grievant.
The second argument is potentially more problematic. In es-
sence, that argument questions the propriety of proceeding on
the legal issues presented in these cases considering the necessa-
rily limited discovery and relative lack of power to compel testi-
mony inherent to the arbitration process.1 4 Although the crux of
each dispute should turn upon factual determinations, the states
must still determine what the legal position of the other party
will be so that they can develop their strategies accordingly." 5
Congress has emphasized over the years, via the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, that it does not favor courtroom surprise,
and that full disclosure provides the optimal method of deter-
mining the truth of a matter.
Regardless of the strength of that argument, however, a con-
vincing case can be made that it does not apply in the arbitra-
tion context considered here. At trial, it is unlikely that the par-
ties would engage in much, if any, discovery; the facts of the
case would be known to both. Inability to compel testimony like-
wise should present no obstacle to the implementation of arbi-
tration, as the arbitrators' decision would likely be based on the
affidavits supplied by the parties in their factual presentations.
Arbitration is not a trial, but an alternative to a trial. The same
doctrine that in many cases hamstrings a court of law should not
act to frustrate a finder of fact.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES
Each of the three possible alternatives open to Congress for
the resolution of the difficulties of water allocation compact
commission deadlock must be analyzed in light of the others. A
tie-breaking requirement, although the most cost efficient and
expeditious, fails to account for the traditional goal of water al-
location compacts-equitable apportionment. A tiebreaker is
forced into accepting one position or the other, regardless of the
114. Id. at 112-13.
115. At the very least, the parties must familiarize the arbitrators with the law per-
taining to construction of the compact.
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substantive merits of either. In light of the extreme importance
attached to equitable apportionment, the cost and time savings
fostered by a tiebreaker fail to tip the balance in the tiebreaker's
favor.
A federal water agency, designed to adjudicate water compact
disputes administratively, also appears to be a less than
favorable alternative. An agency could, if it were granted the
power to make determinations on a nonadversarial basis, de-
crease the time necessary for hearing and decision. Moreover, a
nonadversarial fact-finding mechanism could result in greater
objective fairness to the party-states. Nevertheless, establish-
ment of a federal water agency is not a truly feasible alternative.
Congress has been reluctant to find new, innovative ways to
spend limited dollars. This proposal, admittedly a costly one,
probably would not be popular as a result. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, Congress has also shown great reluctance to allow
nonadversarial factfinders in legal settings. Congress has made
limited use of nonadversarial fact finding, but it is unlikely to
part with the adversary system entirely. Absent this crucial ele-
ment, the water agency plan is no longer desirable. An agency
dependent upon adversarial fact-finding methods is virtually in-
distinguishable from the current system.
Arbitration, however, fulfills the goals of cost and time sav-
ings, in addition to efficiently accomplishing the equitable ap-
portionment of river waters. Although there are concerns with
this proposal, in particular with the due process limitations en-
gendered by a system where the factual-legal presentation is
much abbreviated, it is nevertheless the most sound of the three
alternatives presented. An arbitration clause alone would truly
allow for equitable apportionment of interstate river waters,
while preserving the values of a federal system. A tiebreaker, as
noted above, could only choose between alternatives; it could not
craft its own solution to the problem. A water agency could do
the job, but only at considerable cost, both to state autonomy
and to the U.S. Treasury. An arbitration panel, however, could
obviate each of these concerns. The panel would be bound by
the spirit, if not the letter, of the compact. This fact alone would
reduce the uncertainties created by allowing non-lawyers to ad-
judicate legal claims. The arbitrators would have the body of rel-
evant law before them and could likely base their decision on
the face of the compact alone.
Time and cost savings present subsidiary reasons for accept-
ance of arbitration as the most suitable alternative to Supreme
Court litigation. Although not as expeditious and inexpensive as
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a tiebreaker, it does seem likely that an arbitration panel could
convene more quickly and resolve the issue with less expense
than could a water board, particularly given the possibility of
intra-agency appeals. In light of the other advantages of arbitra-
tion in this context, any disadvantages vis-A-vis a tiebreaker is of
little or no consequence.
CONCLUSION
With a resource as important as water is to the continued de-
velopment of the western United States becoming a more fre-
quent subject of interstate dispute, it is necessary to reexamine
the current mode of resolving allocation disputes. The current
system, placing primary emphasis upon the Supreme Court as
referee, appears to be failing. Disputes not only heap great ex-
penses on the litigating parties, but also consume equally huge
amounts of time.
Given the constitutional framework involved, as well as a
sense of the congressional mood, three possible alternatives to
the present system exist: a tiebreaker, a federal water agency,
and an arbitration clause. Of these three alternatives, arbitration
is the best solution available. It best preserves the federal values
embodied in the compact clause and improves the cost and time
efficiency of the adjudication. Finally, arbitration allows individ-
ual compacts to fulfill their raison d'etre: equitable appor-
tionment.
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